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I. INTRODUCTION
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,1 the Supreme Court put to rest the
notion that self-described “learned professionals” were exempt from the
nation’s antitrust laws. Rejecting the defendant bar association’s claim that
“competition is inconsistent with the practice of a profession because
enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities; the goal is to
provide services necessary to the community,”2 the Court warned that

* Professor of Law and Business Administration, Duke University. This paper was first
drafted when Professor Richman was a Scholar in Residence and Senior Fellow, Center on Law,
Economics, and Organization, at Columbia Law School. Professor Richman is also the President of
Congregation Beth El in Durham, North Carolina. This Article was presented at the Pepperdine
University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?
1. 421 U.S. 773 (1973).
2. Id. at 786.
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carving out such an exemption would empower professionals “to adopt
anticompetitive practices with impunity.”3
Despite Goldfarb’s grave warning against permitting professionals to
engage in anticompetitive collusion, there remain professionals who—in
violation of the Sherman Act—painstakingly construct industry rules to
secure for themselves a captive market that is subject to their exploitation
and control. And despite Goldfarb’s sweeping charge to enforce the
Sherman Act widely, those professionals continue to claim to be exempted
from antitrust scrutiny. But instead of invoking a so-called “learned
professionals exemption” to the Sherman Act, they instead hide behind the
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. Worse, these professionals employ
the First Amendment as a license to suppress the very religious expression
the Religion Clauses are designed to protect.
The professionals at issue are America’s rabbis, who currently organize
cartels that control their placement across the nation. When a synagogue
needs to hire a pulpit rabbi, it is confronted with tightly controlled
professional organizations with strict placement rules. Those rules require
both rabbis seeking employment and congregations hoping to hire a pulpit
rabbi to exclusively use designated placement offices run by the rabbinical
associations. These rules—which are enforced through punishments to both
rabbis and congregations that act independently—prohibit rabbis and
congregations from communicating directly and seeking preferred matches
through multiple media. The rules thus severely limit the supply of rabbis
available to hiring congregations and prevent both rabbis and congregations
from enjoying the benefits of an open labor market. They also meaningfully
interfere with a congregation’s ability to deliberate fully over whom to
interview, pursue, and select to be its religious leader of choice. In short,
these tight restraints on employment convert the rabbinic organizations into
professional cartels that simultaneously restrain the operation of a potentially
competitive labor market and prevent congregations from freely expressing
their religious practices and beliefs.
Such economic coercion would normally be a textbook Sherman Act
violation. Moreover, subjugation of a religious community from pursuing
its preferred form of religious practice would be thought to encroach upon
the essence of what the First Amendment is supposed to protect. Yet the
First Amendment can only offer congregations direct protection from state
action. This exposes one of the great limitations of the First Amendment:
although the Free Exercise Clause can prohibit government intrusion on
religious expression, it does nothing to protect communities from similar
intrusion or regulation on the part of private parties, including coreligionists. The Sherman Act, however, does endow parties injured by
3.

Id. at 787.
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anticompetitive conduct with private causes of action and therefore can
protect these communities from the religious and economic bullying by the
rabbinic organizations.
Yet, in an illustration of the First Amendment’s double-edges, the
Religion Clauses are not only unable to protect congregations from the
economic coercion of rabbinic bodies, but they have been invoked to
sanitize that very subjugation. Because the Religion Clauses protect
religious groups against certain enforcement actions by the state, any private
legal action against these rabbinic organizations—even if such an action was
intended to promote religious expression—also must conform to the First
Amendment. Therefore, if the Sherman Act were to protect community
synagogues and compensate for the shortcomings of the Religion Clauses, it
must also jump through the hoops set by those same clauses.
This essay explores this interesting—and important—intersection
between the Sherman Act and the First Amendment’s religious protections.
It focuses on the labor market for pulpit rabbis, in which national rabbinic
associations impose rules upon both their members and hiring congregations
that deny basic economic freedoms. These freedoms are normally protected
by the Sherman Act and, I argue, should be so protected, not only to secure
for congregations the benefits of market choice, fair competition, and
protection against economic exploitation, but also to secure their religious
liberties. After detailing the rabbinic labor market and placement policies,
the essay offers a constitutional analysis of alleged First Amendment
protections, and a normative analysis of how proper application of the
Sherman Act would liberate both the American rabbinate and American
Judaism. The central argument is quite simple: both the Sherman Act and
the Religion Clauses are intended to protect the populous from entrenched
power, one against economic concentration and the other against the
concentration of religious authority. When entrenched economic power is
religious in nature, the Sherman Act and First Amendment should act in
concert, rather than at odds with one another.
II. THE RABBI CARTELS
Most synagogues in the United States belong to one of four movements:
Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist. The three nonOrthodox movements—the focus of this essay—vary significantly in their
theologies and the practices they encourage their member synagogues to
adopt, but they are distinct from Orthodox communities (which themselves
vary widely) in their adoption of egalitarian gender roles and alteration of
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religious law and practices to conform to post-Enlightenment values.4 Each
of these non-Orthodox movements rests on three institutional foundations:
educational seminaries that espouse their distinctive theologies and train
rabbis, rabbinical associations that serve as governing and representative
bodies for the movement’s rabbis, and congregational associations that
establish standards for member synagogues.5
Each movement’s rabbinical association is a professional association,
established as a non-profit corporation, that sets the standards for Jewish law
and practice for its respective movement, serves the professional and
personal needs of its member rabbis, and fosters institutional linkages
between the movement’s rabbinate and other central organizations. The
Rabbinical Assembly (RA) consists of the Conservative movement’s 1600
member rabbis worldwide who either have been ordained at the seminaries
affiliated with the Conservative movement or rabbis ordained elsewhere who
have accepted the tenets of Conservative Judaism.6 Similarly, the Central
Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), the professional association of
Reform rabbis, and the Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association (RRA) for
Reconstructionist rabbis, consist of rabbis ordained at their own seminaries,
as well as rabbis ordained elsewhere but who adhere to the movement’s
central tenets.7 Membership in these rabbinical associations is voluntary, but
it is essential to rabbis who wish to be employed in synagogues affiliated
with their individual movements because among the associations’ primary
responsibilities is their administration of the placement authorities for their
respective movements. These placement commissions, organized under the
close supervision of the rabbinical associations’ leadership, are laden with
restrictive rules designed to promote and protect the employment of their
members. Each of the three non-Orthodox rabbinical associations organize
placement under similar (and, as will be shown, similarly illegal) rules and
are thus subject to the same legal analysis. For the purposes of illustration,
the Conservative movement’s Rabbinical Assembly will be described in
detail and will serve as the object of legal analysis.
The RA considers its administration of the Joint Placement Commission
as one of its most central responsibilities.8 Charged with the responsibility
4. See BERNARD LAZERWITZ ET AL., JEWISH CHOICES: AMERICAN JEWISH
DENOMINATIONALISM 133–38 (1998) (discussing the origins of and distinctions between the
denominations).
5. See id.
6. About Us, THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/about-us (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012) (describing the Rabbinical Assembly as “the international association of
Conservative rabbis”).
7. See CENT. CONF. OF AM. RABBIS, http://ccarnet.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012);
RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL ASS’N, http://www.therra.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
8. Mission Statement, THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/aboutus/mission-statement (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
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of connecting RA members seeking employment with congregations
searching to hire a pulpit rabbi, the Joint Placement Commission organizes
the job market for rabbis seeking employment at Conservative congregations
and is the only recognized body with the authority to place rabbis in the
Conservative movement. Only RA members are entitled to utilize the
commission’s placement process, and RA members are required to seek
employment as congregational rabbis exclusively through the RA’s
commission.
The Placement Commission makes available its database of RA rabbinic
candidates only to “congregation[s] in good standing of the Conservative
movement . . . .”9 A congregation choosing to enlist in the RA’s placement
process, however, is subject to explicit conditions. The RA’s placement
manual for congregations, Aliyah, highlights these restrictions in bullet form:
•

A congregation may search for a rabbi only through the offices of
the Placement Commission. Eligible candidates are those whose
resumes are forwarded by the Placement Commission.

•

A congregation served by the Commission shall not advertise in the
media for a rabbi. If a congregation advertises, it will be removed
from the Placement List.

•

If a congregation interviews a non-Rabbinical Assembly rabbi
without the specific written approval of the Commission, the
congregation will be removed from the Placement List.

•

If a congregation engages a non-Rabbinical Assembly rabbi without
the specific written approval of the Commission, the congregation
will lose placement privileges for at least a year the next time it
seeks a rabbi. Other consequences may apply. Similar rules apply
to rabbinic candidates as well.10

Consequently, Conservative congregations seeking to find a Conservative
rabbi are confronted with what amounts to a Hobson’s choice: either the

9. RABBI ELLIOT SALO SCHOENBERG, ALIYAH: THE RABBINIC SEARCH AS AN UPLIFTING
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 50 (2008), available at http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/placement/
sitedocs/Aliyah-abridged.pdf.
10. Id. at 3–4.
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congregation seeks rabbinic candidates exclusively through the RA or it is
foreclosed from RA candidates altogether.
The RA’s rules pose an even more meaningful threat to its own
members (hinted at in the lattermost bullet, referencing “similar rules” to
rabbinic candidates).
RA members who seek employment through
alternative mechanisms—whether in addition to or instead of the RA
Placement Commission—will be punished by the Assembly, including being
excluded from using the RA placement processes for an extended period.
This applies even for happenstance matches, in which a Conservative
congregation was introduced to a particular rabbi outside the RA placement
process and developed a strong desire to employ him/her, and that same
rabbi has a strong desire to be hired by that congregation. Both that
congregation and the rabbi seeking employment must nonetheless go
through the RA Placement Commission and are prohibited from directly
discussing possible employment without receiving formal permission from
the Placement Commission, which in many instances refuses to grant
permission. Consequently, the Placement Commission positions itself as an
unavoidable intermediary in all rabbinical hiring in the Conservative
movement.
The RA Placement Commission exploits its position as an intermediary
to both monitor and restrict individual placements. Most meaningfully, the
RA filters the selection of candidates congregations may interview,
restricting whom a congregation may interview (and hire) and to which
congregation a rabbinical candidate may apply. Congregations that contact
and interview candidates who are not presented by the RA, even if such
candidates are RA members and seeking employment through the Placement
Commission, are subject to penalties.
The RA filters candidates for individual placement according to a stated
set of rules that give priority to seniority and other RA priorities. For
example: (a) congregations with rabbis with the titles of “assistant rabbi” or
“associate rabbi” are prohibited from promoting those rabbis to a senior
position without permission from the Placement Commission; (b)
congregations who have hired an “interim rabbi” to temporarily assume
pulpit duties may not consider him/her for the permanent rabbinic position,
even if both the congregation and the interim rabbi desire to continue the
pulpit relationship; (c) rabbinic candidates need to have a minimum number
of years of experience before being permitted to apply to mid-size and large
congregations, and conversely, mid-size and large congregations are only
permitted to interview candidates with a requisite number of years of
experience; new members of the RA are considered to have no more than
two years of seniority, regardless of their actual professional experience,
thus limiting their application possibilities.
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Accordingly, irrespective of the desires of different congregations with
different needs, and irrespective of the individual preferences of particular
rabbis, RA placement rules restrict the mutual preferences of hiring
congregations and rabbis seeking employment.
The RA Placement
Commission substitutes its own values, preferences, and judgment for those
of the congregation’s leadership and individual rabbis seeking to build their
own careers.
III. RELIGIOUS PROTECTIONS AND THE SHERMAN ACT
There is little dispute that the RA’s placement rules amount to an illegal
group boycott. The Sherman Act unequivocally prohibits competitors from
colluding to control a market, restrict consumer choice, and exclude
competitors. A recent collection of antitrust scholars recently petitioned the
Supreme Court to recognize that these “restraints by clergy inflict precisely
the harmful economic consequences that Congress intended to prevent when
it enacted the Sherman Act.”11 A rudimentary antitrust analysis concludes
that the Rabbinical Assembly’s hiring restraints are in violation of the
Sherman Act.
The observation that the RA’s placement policies are illegal was not
long ago opined in a guest column in The Jewish Daily Forward.12 In
response, the RA issued a statement claiming that their policies are
“consistent with the First Amendment protections afforded to religious
institutions and therefore not likely to be assailable under anti-trust
arguments.”13 The First Amendment, however, offers far less protection
than the RA’s statement suggests. Perhaps the RA’s motivation behind
issuing its statement—in addition to providing comfort to its members that
its policies and centralized authority will remain undisturbed—was chiefly
to drape a religious cloak over the RA’s highly economic functions, so as to
characterize an economic boycott as a mobilization of expressive conduct.14

11. Amicus Brief of Antitrust Professors and Scholars in Support of Respondents at 11,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief of Antitrust Professors].
12. Barak D. Richman, Rabbi Searches Are Tough, but Are They Illegal?, JEWISH DAILY
FORWARD (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.forward.com/articles/131723/ (“The inescapable conclusion
is that the RA’s practices are illegal, and have been for a long time.”).
13. Gilah Dror & Julie Schonfeld, Statement About the Placement System, RA NEWS ALERT
(Rabbinical Assembly, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2010 (on file with author).
14. Cf. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (declaring group
boycotts to be per se illegal if they are motivated by economic purposes and achieve economic
effects); Costello Publ’g Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (subjecting the economic
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A proper constitutional analysis, however, is largely a power analysis that
first evaluates whether the Constitution affords Congress the power to enact
legislation that constrains a religious organization’s conduct and whether
courts have the power to enforce such legislation against those
organizations. The first question regarding legislative power references
protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause and, relatedly, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The second question regarding a
court’s authority to enforce such legislation references protections afforded
by the Establishment Clause. This section evaluates the ironic question of
whether the First Amendment immunizes the Rabbinical Assembly from
Sherman Act scrutiny, thereby empowering it to restrict the religious
expression of the nation’s Conservative congregations.
A. The Free Exercise Clause, Smith, and the Sherman Act’s Neutrality
Although the language of the First Amendment’s guarantee that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof” is notoriously terse, the Supreme Court
has long held that its guarantees of religious freedoms are not absolute.15
The First Amendment has been interpreted to ensure near-absolute
protection of religious belief, but its protections of religious conduct are
“qualified.”16 Thus, religiously motivated conduct “remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society” since “[t]he freedom to act must
have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection.”17
The First Amendment does not, for example, restrict Congress from
passing and enforcing neutral laws of general applicability even if those laws
burden or even prohibit particular religious practices.18 The seminal 1990
Supreme Court case Employment Division v. Smith held that “if prohibiting
the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the

conduct of religious institutions to Sherman Act scrutiny, recognizing that religious expression is
frequent a part of any such institution’s conduct).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“Thus the
Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1879).
16. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670–71 n.13 (1988).
17. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304; cf. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the
U.S., Inc., 646 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The possibility that a law of general application
might indirectly and unintentionally impede an organization’s efforts to communicate its message
effectively can’t be enough to condemn the law.”).
18. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas,
131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
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First Amendment has not been offended.”19 Therefore, a law is enforceable
under the Constitution even if it significantly burdens a religious practice so
long as (1) it is a neutral law of general applicability and (2) it is not
specifically directed at a particular religious behavior or motivated by a
desire to interfere with religion.20 Neutral laws that burden religion, without
any explicit or pretextual intent to target particular religious conduct, do not
violate the Constitution.21
The Sherman Act is plainly a neutral and generally applicable law that
prohibits conduct that Congress is empowered to regulate.22 Moreover, the
Sherman Act is both neutral and generally applicable insofar as it applies to
all industries and groups.23 The Sherman Act would therefore pass the first
prong of the test from Smith.
Additionally, the Sherman Act was not passed with any Congressional
intent to target religious groups or religious practice. Although scholars
debate Congress’s precise motivations underlying the Sherman Act, none
have contended that Congress enacted it with a specific goal to burden
religion.24 If anything, Congress’s focus was on ending the anticompetitive
behavior of secular entities, such as the trusts that dominated the industrial
economy at the time.25

19. Id. at 878.
20. Id. at 878–79; see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531 (1993).
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 880.
22. Id. at 879 (defining a neutral law of general applicability as a “valid law prohibiting conduct
that the State is free to regulate”); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005) (“Then, in
response to rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy,
Congress ‘ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power,’ beginning with the
enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, 24 Stat. 379, and the Sherman Antitrust Act in
1890 . . . .”).
23. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978) (refusing to find
an exemption from the Sherman Act for a particular industry on the grounds that given the broad
sweep of the Sherman Act, such arguments are “foreclose[d]” to the courts and more “properly
addressed to Congress”).
24. For a sampling of attempts to discern the legislative intent behind the Sherman Act, see
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION
(1955) (arguing that Congress’s intent was not only to fight trusts, but that they were motivated by
an egalitarian political rationale aimed at empowering consumers, maximizing consumer surplus,
and equalizing political participation); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (arguing that Congress was chiefly concerned with achieving
economic efficiency and advancing consumer welfare); William L. Letwin, Congress and the
Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956) (arguing for an interpretation
that suggests a populist legislative intent from Congress directed at an overall goal of fighting the
trusts, with flexibility and political compromise as the means for doing so).
25. See generally THORELLI, supra note 24.
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Accordingly, even if the Sherman Act burdens religious conduct by the
Rabbinical Assembly or any other religious group, its application is still
constitutional. The Free Exercise Clause does not prevent the application of
the Sherman Act to the rules and practices regarding rabbi searches of the
Rabbinical Assembly.26
B. RFRA and Pre-Smith Protections
Congress responded to the Smith ruling by enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which states: “Government shall
not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability . . . .”27 Recognizing that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion,”28 Congress attempted to overturn the test from
Smith and instead re-institute the standard in Sherbert v. Verner29 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder,30 which subjected laws to greater scrutiny. However,
RFRA does not curtail application of the Sherman Act to the Rabbinical
Assembly since the Placement Commission’s restraints are not protected
even under the pre-Smith understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court cases limited RFRA to federal law, so
the RA would remain subject to—and be in violation of—state competition
laws.31
1. Pre-Smith, Commercial Conduct, and Indirect Burdens
RFRA applies to federal laws, even laws of general applicability, and it
therefore prohibits the Sherman Act from “substantially burden[ing] a
person’s exercise of religion” unless its “application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”32 Congress passed RFRA explicitly “to restore the compelling

26. It should be noted, however, that the protections of the Free Exercise Clause have been
extended to organizations and institutions (such as the Rabbinical Assembly) in addition to
individuals. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
27. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a), 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
(2006)).
28. Id. § 2(a)(4).
29. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006).
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interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder,”33 and
the Supreme Court, in its only post-Smith application of RFRA—other than
clarifying that the central inquiry in RFRA is whether a particular law
substantially burdens “a person’s” exercise of religion and whether the
government can satisfy the compelling interest test through application of
the law “to the person”—relied chiefly on its pre-Smith decisions to guide its
application of RFRA.34
Even under this standard, however, the Supreme Court found in the vast
majority of Free Exercise cases that neutral and generally applicable laws—
like the Sherman Act—either did not substantially burden religion or that
any burden was justified by a compelling government interest.
Commentators have observed that after the Court’s upholding of a Free
Exercise challenge to a generally applicable statute in Yoder, the Supreme
Court “rejected every claim for a free exercise exemption to come before it”
for eighteen years.35 These denials of Free Exercise claims include
challenges to the requirement of social security numbers, military standards,
and the administration of government programs.36
In denying these Free Exercise challenges, the pre-Smith Supreme Court
both scrutinized with a good deal of rigor how substantially a particular law
burdened religious practice, as well as showed significant deference to a
state’s claims of a compelling government interest. In Braunfeld v.
Brown37—a case that applied the pre-Smith test to facts that relate
thematically to the Rabbinic Assembly’s restraint—the Supreme Court
rejected a Free Exercise challenge by observant Jews to Sunday closing
laws. The group argued that because Jewish law required them to close their

33. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (internal citations omitted).
34. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006).
35. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1990).
36. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (permitting
the U.S. Forest Service to harvest timber even if doing so would “virtually destroy” a group’s ability
to practice its religion); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting a proposed Free Exercise
exemption from individuals having to provide social security numbers); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that an Orthodox Jewish doctor in the Air Force did not have a valid
Free Exercise exemption from the Air Force’s dress code because of his religious belief in wearing a
yarmulke); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (“We have never invalidated any
governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment
compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in context other
than that, we have always found the test satisfied . . . .”), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas,
131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
37. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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businesses on Saturdays, the additional obligation to also close on Sunday
would create too great a burden.38 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren, wrote that to “strike down . . . legislation which imposes only an
indirect burden on the exercise of religion,” particularly in light of the fact
that the statute did not prohibit or force any particular religious belief,
“would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.”39 The
Court additionally concluded that the government’s interest in having a
uniform day of rest without assorted exceptions was sufficiently compelling
to permit the state to establish closing laws that disfavored certain religious
minorities.40
The pre-Smith Court expressed a similarly strong hesitation to permit
Free Exercise challenges to give religious organizations exemptions from tax
laws and commercial regulations.41 In United States v. Lee, for example, the
Court rejected a claim from an Amish business owner that the Free Exercise
Clause exempted him from paying Social Security taxes, ruling that “[w]hen
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience
and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are
binding on others in that activity.”42 Without questioning the central
importance of governments maintaining “fiscal vitality,”43 the Court
additionally emphasized the compelling interest to the federal government in
creating a “comprehensive national program” that had to be “uniformly
applicable to all.”44 The Court exhibited a similar hesitation in exempting
religious organizations from commercial laws even when those laws
impacted specific religious conduct, such as when sale and use taxes are
applied to sales of religious literature, although it upheld Free Expression
challenges to taxes that specifically targeted religious conduct or similar
First Amendment expression.45 The Court recently characterized these cases
to mean that general laws are upheld when carving out exceptions would
compromise the underlying purpose of the laws.46

38. Id. at 601; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 (1961) (rejecting a similar
Establishment Clause challenge to Sunday closing laws).
39. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603, 606.
40. Id. at 608–09.
41. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
42. Id. at 261.
43. Id. at 258.
44. Id. at 261–62.
45. The Court distinguished the imposition of general taxes that burdened religiously motivated
conduct from specific taxes that targeted a First Amendment activity, such as solicitation. Compare
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990), with Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
46. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006).
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Under this case law, the Rabbinic Assembly’s claim that RFRA exempts
it from the Sherman Act is unlikely to prevail. First, and most significant,
the Sherman Act imposes little, if any, burden on “a person’s” exercise of
religion. The Sherman Act burdens no member of the Rabbinical Assembly
from their commitment to observe Jewish laws or serve in their capacity as a
congregational rabbi. Even the religious elements of the Rabbinical
Assembly’s mission itself (if the organization is identified as a “person”
under the statute) is not compromised by the Sherman Act, which does
nothing to prevent the professional organization from fulfilling its mission to
establish religious standards and support its clergy members. These
purported burdens on religious exercise pale in comparison to the burdens
placed on the UDV Church by the Controlled Substances Act, which
outlawed the sacramental tea church members use to give communion,47 or
to the Seventh Day Adventist, who was denied unemployment benefits even
though her religious conviction was the cause of her unemployment.48
Second, the Sherman Act is intended to be a sweeping statute, without
exceptions, to advance Congress’s policy of competition.49 The Court has
rejected claims that certain professions are exempt from the Sherman Act’s
policy of promoting competition, so tailoring an exemption for RA members
compromises that congressional policy. The Court has consistently
remarked that “Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could in § 1 of
the Sherman Act,” which “shows a carefully studied attempt to bring within
the Act every person engaged in business whose activities might restrain or
monopolize commercial intercourse among the states.”50
Rabbinical
candidates entering a competitive labor market should be subject to the rules
of competition that govern other labor markets since, like the Amish
business owner, the rabbis “enter into commercial activity as a matter of
choice.”51 Although one’s personal religious practices are not commercial
activity, an effort to control the hiring of rabbis to pulpit positions
nationwide certainly is.

47. Id. at 425.
48. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
49. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (“And our cases have repeatedly
established that there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions . . . .” (citing United States
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51 (1963); California v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482,
485 (1962))); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national
economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.”).
50. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787–88 (quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n.,
322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944)).
51. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
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In sum, under the standards set out by both the pre-Smith Court’s
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and the modern Court’s
interpretation of RFRA, enforcing the Sherman Act against the Rabbinical
Assembly does not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,”
and RFRA therefore does not curtail the Sherman Act’s scrutiny of the
Rabbinic Assembly’s placement practices.
2. RFRA’s Gaping Hole
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled that RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to laws made by state and local governments.52
The Court held that while Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment
empowers Congress to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, that
enforcement power is limited to enacting legislation that “is only preventive
or remedial” of constitutional violations.53 The Court ruled that Congress
exceeded its Section V authority in passing RFRA because the statute lacked
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the
legitimate end to be achieved.”54
RFRA therefore does not curtail state law, including the individual
competition laws that each state has enacted.55 Many of these state
competition laws “use statutory language that tracks the federal statutes
closely [and] by either statute or state supreme court declaration, they hold
that on substantive issues federal case law should be regarded as
precedential.”56 Although Congress, through RFRA, might have curtailed
application of federal antitrust laws, it has no authority to limit state antitrust
laws, which by and large are substantively equivalent.57
In the wake of the City of Boerne ruling, sixteen states also enacted socalled “mini-RFRA” laws to reinstate pre-Smith protections of religious
conduct against their own laws.58 Therefore, just as RFRA could be read as

52. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
53. Id. at 508 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (internal
quotations omitted)).
54. Id. at 530.
55. 16 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2401 (2d ed. 2006).
56. Id. ¶ 2410; see also id. ¶ 2401 (“Nearly all states have legislation that emulates the Sherman
Act, while a somewhat smaller number also have statutes emulating provisions of the Clayton
Act.”).
57. For example, New York—the state in which the RA is located—has a tradition of
interpreting its state antitrust act, the Donnelly Act, in conjunction with the Sherman Act. See
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 520 N.E.2d 535, 538–39 (N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he Donnelly Act—
often called a ‘Little Sherman Act’—should generally be construed in light of Federal precedent and
given a different interpretation only where State policy, differences in the statutory language or the
legislative history justify such a result.”).
58. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52571B (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–.05 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401 to -

1360

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 1347, 2013]

1/9/13 2:31 PM

Saving the First Amendment from Itself
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

a limitation of the Sherman Act, mini-RFRAs might similarly limit some
corresponding state antitrust statutes. In these sixteen “mini-RFRA states,”
application of the antitrust laws is subject to pre-Smith protections. In the
thirty-four states without mini-RFRA statutes, however, there is no such
limitation. Therefore, even if RFRA and mini-RFRAs are broadly
interpreted to limit applying competition laws to the conduct of religious
organizations, they still do not limit the application of state antitrust laws in
these thirty-four states.
C. The Establishment Clause, Entanglement, and Intra-Denominational
Disputes
Courts are appropriately leery of entering into ecclesiastical disputes.
When confronted with a legal dispute that requires the dissection and
interpretation of religious or doctrinal authority, any court intervention or
ruling amounts to an endorsement of a particular religious position and thus
runs afoul of the Establishment Clause (it might also transgress the Free
Exercise Clause, since the ruling infringes on the losing party’s expression).
Therefore, “[t]he general rule is that courts are prohibited by the First
Amendment from getting involved in intra-church disputes when doing so
would require them to become entangled in religious affairs.”59
The First Amendment does not, however, prohibit courts from
intervening in intra-denominational disputes altogether. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court affirmed courts’ roles in resolving such disputes. When
adjudicating a property dispute between competing factions in a local
Presbyterian congregation, the Court noted, “[t]here can be little doubt about
the general authority of civil courts to resolve this question. The State has
an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property
disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church
property can be determined conclusively.”60

404 (West 2009); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-99 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302–.307
(West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to -5 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251–258
(West 2010); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–2407 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 4280.1-1 to -4 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407
(West 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001–.012 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 63l-5-101 to -403 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-I to -2.02 (West 2009).
59. 2 W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 10:44
(2011).
60. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
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The First Amendment, however, “severely circumscribes” how civil
courts can intervene.61 A series of Supreme Court rulings have interpreted
the First Amendment to require courts to adjudicate such disputes relying
only on “neutral principles of law” to guide its judicial intervention.62 For
example, in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, which involved a
dispute over the rightful occupier of a chaplaincy established by will, the
Supreme Court prohibited a civil court from determining whether a disputant
satisfied “qualifications required by the canon law” to serve as a chaplain for
the Roman Catholic Church.63 However, “the civil courts could adjudicate
the rights under the will without interpreting or weighing church doctrine,
but simply by engaging in the narrowest kind of review of a specific church
decision—i.e., whether that decision resulted from fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness.”64 Similarly, the Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church invalidated a state court
ruling that conditioned a granting of property on a church’s adherence to a
traditional faith and doctrine and required any court intervention to avoid
ecclesiastical determinations.65 The Court stated the rule clearly:
[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil
courts may play in resolving church property disputes. It is
obvious, however, that not every civil court decision as to property
claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by
the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of
religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church
property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use
in all property disputes, which can be applied without “establishing”
churches to which property is awarded.66
This “neutral principles” approach extends to situations in which rival
intra-denominational factions dispute over the appointment of clergy. In
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, for example, the
Supreme Court refused to prevent the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the
Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church—which the Court described as
the “Mother Church”—from defrocking a local bishop even when he and
local parishioners argued the Mother Church acted arbitrarily and not in
61. Id.
62. Id.; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 449 (1969).
63. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (“Because the appointment
is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.”).
64. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 451 (discussing Gonzalez).
65. Id. at 447.
66. Id. at 449.
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accordance with Church doctrine.67 Recognizing that the Serbian Orthodox
Church was “a hierarchical church [whereby] the sole power to appoint and
remove its Bishops rests in the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod,” the Court
ruled that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts
shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a
church of hierarchical polity.”68 To intervene in hiring disputes within a
hierarchical polity, the Court concluded, necessarily requires doctrinal
evaluation or review of ecclesiastical authority.69 The Court gave similar
deference to hierarchical church authority during Cold War challenges to the
Russian Orthodox Church, when American parishes wanted to assume
possession of Russian Orthodox property and to appoint their own
Archbishop.70 Recognizing that “[t]here are occasions when civil courts
must draw lines between the responsibilities of church and state for the
disposition or use of property,” the Court concluded that civil courts cannot
trump church rule “when [a] property right follows as an incident from
decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues.”71
Importantly, the neutral principles approach does permit intervention in
some intra-denominational disputes, which is possible when hierarchical
ecclesiastic relationships do not characterize the relationships among the
parties. The Supreme Court, beginning with the seminal case of Watson v.
Jones72 in 1872, has consistently contrasted hierarchical orders, such as the
Russian Orthodox Church in Kedroff and the Serbian Orthodox Church in
Milivojevich, with congregational systems. In hierarchical orders, as the
term suggests, the congregation is “a subordinate member of some general
church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with
a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some
supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general

67. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); see also Gonzalez, 280
U.S. 1.
68. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 696, 709.
69. Id. at 708–09 (“‘To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power
within a [hierarchical] church so as to decide . . . religious law [governing church polity] . . . would
violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.’”
(quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396
U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
70. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
71. Id. at 120–21.
72. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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organization.”73 In contrast, the Supreme Court has recognized that
authority in congregational orders lies in their self-governance.74 Churches
(or synagogues) in congregational orders might be affiliated with a religious
denomination or movement, but they are constituted as independent entities
and develop and adhere to their own rules of governance and organization.
For congregational orders, the Establishment Clause prohibits interference
with congregational decisions, not hierarchical decisions.75
Thus, when an intra-denominational dispute occurs between Jewish
factions within a synagogue—a congregational polity—then neutral
principles permit civil courts to enforce the congregation’s by-laws and
secure its self-governance. In Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation
B’nai Jacob, for example, a synagogue’s majority exercised its authority to
engineer significant changes in religious practices, forcing members who
resisted the change to form their own congregation.76 When the synagogue’s
rival factions continued to dispute the synagogue’s membership criteria, the
New York Court of Appeals intervened to enforce a stipulation “that arose
out of a religious disagreement but was resolved in secular terms.”77 Thus,
neutral principles of law enabled—and compelled—New York’s civil courts
to resolve lingering disputes over “the ownership of the premises, the area of
the synagogue that each congregation could use, the payment for use, and
the percentage that each congregation would receive upon sale or
demolition.”78 Citing First Presbyterian Church and invoking Avitzur v.
Avitzur, a decision it issued a decade earlier that enforced a facially neutral
provision in a religious wedding contract (or Ketubah), the New York Court
of Appeals concluded that court intervention is permitted so long as “no

73. Id. at 722–23; see also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110 (“Hierarchical churches may be defined as
those organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common
ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.”).
74. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872) (holding that the appointed
trustees of the property of a congregational church “cannot be removed from their trusteeship by a
minority of the church society or meeting, without warning, and acting without charges, without
citation or trial, and in direct contravention of the church rules”).
75. Lower federal and state courts have also recognized this distinction. See, e.g., Cent. Coast
Baptist Ass’n v. First Baptist Church, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 119 (Ct. App. 2007) (“If the principle of
government in a church is that the majority of the congregation is the decision-making body, courts
must defer to the decisions of that body. A court may act to ensure that the governing body adheres
to the acknowledged rules by which it conducts its affairs . . . so long as this undertaking does not
require the court to inquire into religious doctrine.”). The line of California Supreme Court cases
from which this reasoning is drawn originated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Watson, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 723.
76. Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Congregation B’nai Jacob, 686 N.E.2d 1330, 1330–31 (N.Y.
1997); see also Sillah v. Tanvir, 794 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App. Div. 2005) (enforcing a petition to install
properly elected trustees of Islamic Falah of America, a religious institution, under the state’s
religious corporations law).
77. Park Slope Jewish Ctr., 686 N.E.2d at 1332.
78. Id.
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doctrinal issue need be passed upon, no implementation of a religious duty is
contemplated, and no interference with religious authority will result.”79
Accordingly, even though a private action against the Rabbinical
Assembly under the Sherman Act would amount to an intra-denominational
dispute, neutral principles of law can readily adjudicate such a claim.
Whether a plaintiff is a rabbi, to whom the labor market is foreclosed, or a
congregation, which is denied the benefits of an open labor market, the
claim would not involve any ecclesiastical determinations, and resolution of
the dispute does not involve an entanglement with religious questions. The
organizational relationships between the relevant parties illustrate the neutral
principles involved.
First, like the synagogue at issue in Park Slope, American synagogues
are independent nonprofit corporations, incorporated under state law and
governed by a board of directors. Many synagogues are affiliated with the
national organizations that lead the different movements, but affiliation is a
voluntary decision by the congregations and, like other congregational
polities, the authority to make those affiliation (and other ritualistic)
decisions lies in congregational self-governance. Specifically, a synagogue
affiliated with the Conservative movement might be a dues-paying member
of United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism (USCJ), an umbrella
association of Conservative congregations, and thus voluntarily abides by
USCJ’s Standards for Congregational Practice (which, importantly,
recommends but does not require adherence to the RA placement policies).80
But being a member of USCJ does not place the congregation under USCJ’s
authority. A Conservative-affiliated synagogue might also, but does not
have to, hire a rabbi who is a member of the Rabbinical Assembly, but that
rabbi is an employee of the congregation. Although the rabbi might be
obligated to adhere to the Rabbinical Assembly’s code of conduct, the
congregation is not subject to the RA’s authority whatsoever. The economic
and organizational relationships between a Conservative congregation and

79. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 139 (N.Y. 1983). Compare id., with Congregation
Yetev Lev D’Satmar v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (N.Y. 2007), in which a New York civil
court refused to intervene in an internal dispute in a Jewish congregation over the succession of the
Grand Satmar Rabbi because part of the dispute depended upon whether a former president was a
member of the synagogue, and “membership issues such as those that are at the core of this case are
an ecclesiastical matter.” See also Kahana, 879 N.E.2d at 1286 (Smith, J., dissenting) (concluding
that neutral principles can determine whether members were elected properly).
80. Standards for Congregational Practice, THE UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF CONSERVATIVE
JUDAISM, http://uscj2004.aptinet.com/Standards_for_Congre5973.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
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the national Conservative organizations are products of voluntary assent, not
religious hierarchical authority.81
And second, the relationships between individual congregations and
national organizations, such as the Rabbinical Assembly and United
Synagogue, are governed by contracts that contain neutral terms. When
enlisting the Rabbinical Assembly to select a rabbi, for example, its leaders
agree to a list of concrete procedures (described in Part II) that resemble
those in a contract binding a homeowner to a real estate agent. A court can
readily interpret and enforce this contract without passing upon a doctrinal
issue, implementing a religious duty, or interfering with religious authority.82
Importantly, a court can similarly use neutral principles to determine
whether that restrictive contract complies with the Sherman Act.
In sum, adjudicating a Sherman Act claim against the Rabbinical
Assembly does not intervene within a hierarchical polity, does not involve
an unconstitutional entanglement of religion, and does not require
interpretation of any ecclesiastical doctrines. The synagogue is an
independent congregation that voluntarily engages in contractual relations
with national organizations. Those contracts can readily be interpreted—and
any dispute between the congregation and the national bodies can readily be
adjudicated—under neutral principles of law.
D. The Ministerial Exception
On January 11, 2012, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
declared in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC that a “ministerial exception” exempted religious organizations from
employment discrimination suits from ministerial employees.83 The Court
reasoned that a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of a religious
organization to select its ministers “is implicated by a suit alleging
discrimination in employment.”84 Such an exception was grounded in both
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its
own faith and mission through its appointments. According the
state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the

81. The decentralization of authority is arguably central to the American Jewish experience, and
perhaps even central to the Jewish Diaspora experience that has characterized Judaism for two
millennia. The imposition of external authority upon, or the denial of community autonomy over,
independent congregations is largely antithetical to Jewish history, theology, and governance.
82. See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138–39.
83. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
84. Id. at 705.
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faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.85
The depth of the Court’s ruling, in both rhetoric and votes, introduces
the possibility that the ministerial exception might bar a Sherman Act suit
against the Rabbinic Assembly. Indeed, the question presented to the Court
characterized the ministerial exception as a bar against “employment-related
lawsuits brought against religious organizations by employees performing
religious functions.”86 Such a characterization left open the possibility that
the exception would bar suits against professional associations of clergy,
such as the Rabbinical Assembly (which may be properly characterized as a
“religious organization”87), and that “employment-related lawsuits” could
include Sherman Act challenges to cartel-like restraints imposed by the
Rabbinical Assembly and other professional associations of clergy that
control an employment market through anticompetitive restraints.88 In other
words, if the ministerial exception applied to all matters of “employment,” it
might exempt broad categories of legal actions beyond those related to
employer-employee relations.
The Court limited its holding to construct a narrow ministerial
exception, ruling only that the ministerial exception applied to certain suits
by employees against religious employers.89 The petitioners conceded, in
fact, that the exception does not apply to suits by third parties, does not
restrict tort claims, and does not restrict laws involved in the “general
regulation of the labor pool.”90 Petitioners themselves indicated that the
ministerial exception only bars claims “that challenge a church’s right to
hire, fire, evaluate, or make rules for its own ministers.” Nothing in either
the Court’s ruling or the parties’ arguments suggest that the exception would
bar suits by independent congregations against religious organizations with
which they contract, or by independent clergy who suffer economic harms
from religious organizations. To be sure, the Court indicates no intention to
immunize clergy from the consequences of asserting its economic power to
injure the economic freedoms of rivals or consumers. Mistakenly infringing

85. Id. at 706.
86. Brief for the Petitioner at i, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553).
87. Amicus Brief of Antitrust Professors, supra note 11, at 1.
88. Id.
89. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit
brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only
that the ministerial exception bars such a suit.”).
90. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 20, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553).
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on economic rights in the name of protecting religious interests crosses
Judge Posner’s admonition: “The commercial tail must not be allowed to
wag the ecclesiastical body.”91
A deeper understanding of the ministerial exception reveals that its
essence vindicates a congregational polity’s use of the Sherman Act against
powerful clergy. The Supreme Court emphasized that the constitutional
motivation behind the exception is “the interest of religious groups in
choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their
mission,”92 and the exception is designed to prevent “government
interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and
mission of the church itself.”93 Because in congregational polities the
internal decision over which minister, pastor, or rabbi to hire lies in the
congregation itself, immunizing a professional organization of clergy from
Sherman Act liability actually is contrary to the motivations underlying the
ministerial exception. This spirit underlying the ministerial exception was
born long before the Supreme Court recognized it earlier this year. In
McClure v. Salvation Army, a Fifth Circuit opinion that first articulated a
constitutional bar on employment discrimination claims against religious
employers by ministerial employees, the court passionately observed that
“[t]he relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its
lifeblood” and “[t]he minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”94
Any claim by the Rabbinical Assembly—or their reform or
reconstructionist counterparts—of being protected by the ministerial
exception, therefore, is misguided on both legal and theological grounds.
True, courts are prohibited from regulating a hierarchical religious order,
like the Catholic Church in Gonzalez and the Serbian and Russian Orthodox
Churches in Milivojevich and Kedroff, and are appropriately prohibited from
intervening in matters concerning the appointment and retention of clergy by
religious employers. But the ministerial exception is targeted to protect the
employment relationship between religious organizations and its ministerial
employees from government regulation. In congregational orders, where
authority is invested in the congregation, the protected relationship is
between the congregation and its clergy, not the clergy’s professional
relationship with itself. Moreover, claiming that the exception immunizes
all conduct related to seeking and obtaining clergy undermines the
ministerial exception itself. The exception is founded on a constitutional

91.
92.
93.
94.
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Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2008).
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
Id. at 707.
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972).
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commitment to safeguard the religious freedom of individual communities—
the very autonomy and self-determination that many have argued has fueled
the blossoming of diverse Jewish experiences for two thousand years. The
ministerial exception not only does not bar a Sherman Act suit, but its
motivations might even encourage one.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rabbinical Assembly’s rules governing its Joint Placement
Commission are illegal. Since the Central Conference of American Rabbis
and the Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association have developed similar
rules governing the placement of pulpit rabbis, those rabbinic organizations
are also in violation of the law. Each placement system imposes severe
restrictions on the labor market for pulpit rabbis without creating any
identifiable pro-competitive benefit, and they are outside the protection of
the First Amendment. By instituting its placement rules, these rabbinic
organizations are acting to advance their own commercial interests to the
detriment of the welfare of consumers, namely the congregations and
congregants who hire and ultimately benefit from a rabbi’s services.
There is much that is troubling about claiming that the First Amendment
protects these organizations from Sherman Act scrutiny. First, it reflects an
arrogant rejection of the decentralization that has sustained Jewish
communities worldwide for nearly two millennia—through global wars,
holy wars, unfriendly host nations, dramatic technological change, and
spectacular social change. And second, it invokes the First Amendment to
sanitize what is little more than the suppression of religious expression. The
First Amendment may not, and ought not, be used to subvert itself.
Although the First Amendment does not support a claim against the rabbinic
organizations that stifle religious expression, the Sherman Act does. At the
very least, the First Amendment should not prevent a claim that would
advance its principles.
Permitting the Sherman Act to fulfill its mandate from Congress to
promote competition and dislodge entrenched concentrations of power will
not only liberate congregations from economic restraints. It will also
significantly contribute to the vitality of Judaism in America. Were
rabbinical organizations to adopt rules that are consistent with the Sherman
Act—rules that empower individual communities and defer to the
preferences of both congregants and rabbis—they would kindle the passions
and empower the dynamism that Jewish communities have shown over time.
Submitting to the Sherman Act might also transform the national rabbinic
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organizations themselves, reorienting them away from authoritarian
placement policies and towards an empowering role in which they help
rabbis pursue fulfilling careers and abet congregations to hire the rabbi that
best suits their needs. Doing so would advance social welfare consistent
with the dictates of the Sherman Act, advance the First Amendment’s
principles of free religious expression, and advance the strength and
robustness of American Judaism.
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